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Systems Analysis of Technological 
and Economic Dynamics 
This new research project at IIASA is concerned with modeling technological 
and organizational change; the broader economic developments that are as-
sociated with technological change, both as cause and effect; the processes by 
which economic agents - first of all, business firms - acquire and develop the 
capabilities to generate, imitate, and adopt technological and organizational 
innovations; and the aggregate dynamics - at the levels of single industries 
and whole economies - engendered by the interactions among agents which 
are heterogeneous in their innovative abilities, behavioral rules and expecta-
tions. The central purpose is to develop stronger theory and better modeling 
techniques. However, the basic philosophy is that such theoretical and mod-
eling work is most fruitful when attention is paid to the known empirical 
details of the phenomena the work aims to address: therefore, a consider-
able effort is put into a better understanding of the 'stylized facts' concerning 
corporate organization routines and strategy; industrial evolution and the 
'demography' of firms; patterns of macroeconomic growth and trade. 
From a modeling perspective, over the last decade considerable progress 
has been made on various techniques of dynamic modeling. Some of this 
work has employed ordinary differential and difference equations, and some 
of it stochastic equations. A number of efforts have taken advantage of 
the growing power of simulation techniques. Others have employed more 
traditional mathematics. As a result of this theoretical work, the toolkit for 
modeling technological and economic dynamics is significantly richer than it 
was a decade ago. 
During the same period, there have been major advances in the empirical 
understanding. There are now many more detailed technological histories 
available. Much more is known about the similarities and differences of 
technical advance in different fields and industries and there is some under-
standing of the key variables that lie behind those differences. A number 
of studies have provided rich information about how industry structure co-
evolves with technology. In addition to empirical work at the technology 
or sector level, the last decade has also seen a great deal of empirical re-
search on productivity growth and measured technical advance at the level 
of whole economies. A considerable body of empirical research now exists 
on the facts that seem associated with different rates of productivity growth 
across the range of nations, with the dynamics of convergence and divergence 
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in the levels and rates of growth of income in different countries, with the 
diverse national institutional arrangements in which technological change is 
embedded. 
As a result of this recent empirical work, the questions that success-
ful theory and useful modeling techniques ought to address now are much 
more clearly defined. The theoretical work described above often has been 
undertaken in appreciation of certain stylized facts that needed to be ex-
plained. The list of these 'facts' is indeed very long, ranging from the micro-
economic evidence concerning for example dynamic increasing returns in 
learning activities or the persistence of particular sets of problem-solving 
routines within business firms; the industry-level evidence on entry, exit and 
size-distributions - approximately log-normal; all the way to the evidence 
regarding the time-series properties of major economic aggregates. However, 
the connection between the theoretical work and the empirical phenomena 
has so far not been very close. The philosophy of this project is that the 
chances of developing powerful new theory and useful new analytical tech-
niques can be greatly enhanced by performing the work in an environment 
where scholars who understand the empirical phenomena provide questions 
and challenges for the theorists and their work. 
In particular, the project is meant to pursue an 'evolutionary ' interpreta-
tion of technological and economic dynamics modeling, first, the processes by 
which individual agents and organizations learn, search, and adapt; second, 
the economic analogs of 'natural selection' by which interactive environments 
- often markets - winnow out a population whose members have different 
attributes and behavioral traits; and, third, the collective emergence of sta-
tistical patterns, regularities, and higher-level structures as the aggregate 
outcomes of the two former processes. 
Together with a group of researchers located permanently at IIASA, the 
project coordinates multiple research efforts undertaken in several institu-
tions around the world, organizes workshops and provides a venue of scien-
tific discussion among scholars working on evolutionary modeling, computer 
simulation and non-linear dynamical systems. 
The research will focus upon the following three major areas: 
l. Learning Processes and Organizational Competence. 
2. Technological and Industrial Dynamics 
3. Innovation, Competition, and Macrodynamics 
Preface 
Since January 1994 the Systems Analysis of Technological and Economic 
Dynamics Project (TED) has been continuing the chain of studies on tech-
nological dynamics at IIASA that can be traced as far back as the early 
1980s. 
This paper deals with a class of stochastic models of technological dif-
fusion based on so-called generalized urn schemes. The models exhibit non-
ergodic limit behavior. In contrast to existing models based on urn schemes, 
the initial state influences not only the shape of the limit distribution, but 
also the support of this distribution. The authors consider the case of strate-
gic price manipulation that can be applied to other cases, for example, mod-
els of bargaining. 
It represents a fragment of the study on one of the three major directions 
of the TED project, namely, modeling of macroeconomic issues. 
Peter E. de Jdnosi 
Director 
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1. Introduction 
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of the process of growth and transformation of contemporary economies. So 
also is the competition among different firms which embody different 
technologies, different expectations and, possibly, show different market 
behaviors. In turn, it is increasingly acknowledged that technological inno-
vations are likely to involve some forms of dynamic increasing returns, i.e., 
some positive feedbacks along their diffusion trajectories [cf. Dosi et al. 
(1988) and Anderson et al. (1988); for an interpretation of the empirical 
evidence, Dosi (1988)]. To study the underlying competitive process a wide 
variety of mathematical approaches has been suggested within and outside 
economic analysis, e.g., ordinary differential equations [as in Polterovich and 
Henkin (1988)], in particular with trajectories on the unit simplex, i.e., of the 
population type [as in Silverberg et al. (1988)], and generalized urn schemes 
which generate stochastic dynamic systems with discrete time and trajectories 
from the unit simplex [cf. Arthur ( 1988) and Arthur et al. ( 1983, 1987c)]. In 
the following we shall present some extensions of the latter approach able to 
handle positive feedbacks that are only 'local' - in the sense that they occur 
only under particular states on the diffusion trajectory - or the coexistence of 
both positive and negative feedback mechanisms in the competitive process 
(the simplest variants of the models presented here can be formally reduced 
to the ones considered in earlier works [Arthur (1988), Arthur et al. (1983, 
1987c)]. We shall apply these generalized urn schemes to two topics 
concerning competing technologies. 
As a first application, we study the dependence of limit market shares from 
some mixed strategies used by risk-averse adopters of the technologies. 
Conceptually, these mixed strategies, which generate some separation within 
the pool of adopters, can be interpreted as the outcome of adaptive learning 
on the features of the new technologies by imperfectly informed agents. 1 
For example, one may assume that the latter decide by observing the choice 
of previous adopters and 'trusting' them, to different degrees. Such a 
behavior is also easily interpretable in terms of 'bounded rationality', and/or 
some interdependence in the returns of individual adopters, depending on the 
relative frequencies of the chosen technologies. Economic examples of such 
interdependences are particular clear with respect to innovation and inno-
vation diffusion [cf. Arthur (1988), David (1985, 1993), Dosi (1988), Hanson 
(1985)] whereby dynamic increasing returns and various sorts of externalities 
are generally observed. However, the modeling techniques suggested here 
could be in principle applied, with the proper modifications, to other 
economic domains involving interdependence of expectations [such as those 
discussed in e.g., Frydman (1982) and Frydman and Phelps (1983)] and 
speculation [cf. Kirman (1991)]. 
The second application concerns the dependence of the final market shares 
1 A similar problem, in the case of Bayesian learning, is analyzed in Arthur and Lane ( 1993). 
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of two technologies on the pricing policies of the firms which produce them. 
In the following, we suppose that each of the firms decreases its price until it 
reaches a certain market share (measured by the proportion of units of the 
technology they produce among all units of all technologies which have been 
sold up to that time). Above that share, prices are increased. An economic 
interpretation of such a behavioral hypothesis is that firms - as often found 
in the business literature - follow strategies aimed at market pre-emption 
and at learning economies until they reach a dominant market position 
which they can exploit thereafter. Whether such pricing policies can be 
derived from strategies of intertemporal profit maximization under imperfect 
information or not is by no means essential to the model. In principle, it is 
meant to analyze the share dynamics of different technologies with endoge-
nous prices (no matter whether the latter are microfounded on intertempor-
ally optimizing agents or not). At each time, prices of each technology can be 
different but adopters may not instantly switch from one to another due to 
e.g., imperfect information, network externalities, etc. Indeed, the stochasticity 
of the process is caused by some mixed strategies used by the adopters in the 
case of approximately equal prices on competing technologies. 
Well beyond the two specifications of the model which we are going to 
present here, one of our aims is to illustrate the general applicability to 
economic and technological dynamics of generalized urn schemes which 
generate discrete time stochastic dynamic systems with multiple equilibria. 
Some of them turn out to be attainable (i.e., they realize with positive 
probabilities). They represent those limit proportions of competing techno-
logies which are feasible. In the following we shall use known results [Arthur 
et al. (1987a, b, 1988), Hill et al. (1980)] concerning generalized urn schemes 
and suggest some further developments. 
In section 2 we shall present the basic theorems on generalized urn 
schemes. Section 3 studies technological competition with imperfect infor-
mation ar1d endogenous preferences for the two technologies. In section 4 we 
analyze the case with endogenous prices. 
2. The theory of generalized urn schemes 
Think of an urn of infinite capacity with black and white balls. Starting 
with nw ~ 1 white balls and nb ~ 1 black balls in the urn, a ball is added at 
time instants t = 1, 2 .... It will be white with probability f(X 1) and black 
with probability 1- f (XJ Here f( · ) is a function [it is sometimes called an 
urn function [Hill et al. (1980)]], which maps R(O, 1) into [O, 1] [R(O, 1) 
stands for the set of rational numbers from (0, l)]. We call X 1 the proportion 
of white balls in the urn at time t. Then the dynamics of X 1 is given by the 
relation 
X 1+ 1 = X 1 +(t+nw + nb)- 1 [~1(X1)-X1] , t~ 1, X 1 = nw(nw +nb) - 1. 
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Here ~r(x), t ~ 1, are random variables independent in t such that 
~ ( ) = {l with probability f(x), 
r x 0 with probability 1- f (x). 
Designate ~r(x)- E~r(x) = ~r(x)- f (x) by ( 1(x). Then we have 
Xt+ 1 = X 1 +(t+nw +nb)- 1 {[J(X1)-XrJ +(r(Xr}, 
) -1 t~l, X 1 =nw(nw+nb · (1) 
Due to E((x) =0, given X 1 =x, the system (1) shifts on average at time t~ 1 
on the value (t+nw+nb)- 1 [f(x)-x]. Consequently limit points of the 
sequence {Xi} have to belong to the set B of zeros of the function f(x)-x 
(for x E [O, 1]). The following statement confirms this hypothesis. 
Theorem 1. [Arthur et al. (1987b)]. The sequence {Xi} converges a.s. to the 
set B as t--+ oo, i.e. p(X 0 B)-+ 0 a.s. as t-+ oo. [Here p(y, Y) is the Euclidean 
distance in R 1 from the point y to the set Y.] 
Because in the studies of urn processes [Arthur et al. (1987a, b, 1988), Hill 
et al. (1980)] one does not require continuity of the function f( · ), then the 
set B has to be properly defined. Put 
B={xE[O, 1]: [g(x),a(x)]30}, 
where g(x)=liminfy_x[f(y)-y] and a(x)=Iimsupy_x[f(y)-y]. Here y 
belongs to R(O, 1). 
It is easy to see that if all of the connected components of B are singleton, 
then the convergence to B implies convergence of the sequence {Xi}. As was 
shown in Arthur et al. (1987b) and Hill et al. (1980), if the set 
G = { x EB: Ve> 0 3y,- , y,+ E R(O, 1), which belong to (x-£, x) or 
(x,x+c), such that f(y,-)<y,- and f(y,+)>y,+} 
is nowhere dense, then the sequence {Xr} turns out to be a.s. convergent 
even in the case when B may contain intervals. 
An isolated point 8 EB is called stable if for every small enough £1 > 0 and 
c2 >0 
[f (x)-x] (x - 8) < 6(c 1 , c2 ) < 0, 
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provided that s 1 ~lx-8l~s2 (xER(0,1)). We shall say that an isolated point 
8 E B is unstable if for every small enough s > 0 
[f(x)-x](x-8) >0, 
provided that x E R(O, 1) n [( 8- s, 8) u ( 8, 8 + s)]. 
Theorem 2. Let 8EB be a stable point, 8E(0, 1). Also there exist Si >0 and 
s2 > 0 such that the following inequalities hold: 
f(x)>O for xER(O,l)n(8-si,8), 
f(x)<l for xER(O,l)n(8,8+s2 ). 
Then P{lim,_ 00 X, =8} >0 for every Xi E(8-si,8+s2 ). 
The proof of the theorem is essentially similar to that given in Arthur et al. 
(1988) and in Hill et al. (1980). We shall only note that the requirements on 
f (.) allow to shift to the left for xi > 8 and to the right for xi < 8 inside 
(8-si,8+s 2 ) with positive probability through a corresponding finite 
number of steps. 
Theorem 3. Suppose that 8EB is an unstable point, 8E(0, 1) and one of the 
following conditions holds true: 
( 1) into a neighborhood of 8 the function f ( ·) is continuous; 
(2) there exists c: > 0 such that, for x E ( 8 - e, 8 + c) n R(O, 1 ), 
[f(x)-x](x-8) ~ Jclx- e1 I +µ,f (x)[I - f (x)] 
~~>O, ~>c(2A+ 1) - 1, 
where µ E [O, I], A> 0 and c = SUPxe(O - e.8+•) n R(O . l) f (x) [1 - f (x)]; 
(3) into a neighborhood of 8 for x ~ 8 (x ~ 8) one of the conditions (1) or (2) 
holds true and for x>8 (x<I:)) it will be f(x)= 1 (f(x)=O). 
Then P{lim,_ 00 X 1 =8}=0.for every X 1 . 
Remark I . The condition (3) differs from conditions (I) and (2) because it 
permits that f(x)[I - f(x)] equals zero in a neighborhood of 8. [Indeed, 
condition (2) postulates positiveness of the value. In the case of condition (I) 
from continuity of f (") at 8 we have f(8) [I - f(8)] = 8(1-8) > 0 and, 
consequently, positive values of f(x)[l - f(x)] occur in the neighborhood 
of 8.] 
Proof. The case with continuous f( ·)was studied in Hill et al. (1980). 
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Under condition (2) we can apply the results from Arthur et al. (1988). Let 
condition (3) hold and f (x) = 1 for x > e. Note that 
P{ lim X1 = e} =P{ Jim X1 =(),X.~ (),s~ 1} 
r- oo r ...... oo 
+ P{ lim X1 = (), X,> ()for some s~ 1}. (2) 
I_, oo 
It is clear that the second term here equals zero. (This is because the process 
X 1, t ~ 1, cannot move to the left from a point lying to the right of ().) If f ( ·) 
is continuous to the left of() we put 
{
f(x) 
f (x) = min[l, x + k(x-{})] 
where k > 1. Otherwise 
{
f(x) 
J(x) = (1 + ()) /2 
for x ~(), 
for x > e. 
for x~e. 
for x>(), 
Using the results of Arthur et al. (1988) and Hill et al. ( 1980), for the process 
Y1 , t ~ 1, corresponding to J( · ), we have 
P{lim Y,=e}=o 
t ... 00 
for every Y1 • Hence for Y1 = X 1 we obtain 
P{lim X,=e,x.~e.s~I}=P{lim Y,=e, r.~e.s~1} 
r -co r- oo 
~P{lim Y1 =e}=o. 
t ... 00 
Consequently, the first term in (2) equals zero too. The case where f(x) =0 
for x < () can be similarly studied. 
The theorem is proved. 
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Conditions of convergence with positive probability to points 0 and 1 are 
given by the next theorem. 
Theorem 4 [Arthur et al. (1983)]. If f(nw(nw+nb+t)- 1)<1 for t~O and 
Lr~of(nw(nw+nb+t)- 1 <oo, then P{lim,_ 00 X 1 =0}>0. Also if 
f((nw+t)(nw+nb+t)- 1 )>0 for t~O and Lr~o[l-f((nw+ 
t)(nw+nb+t) - 1 )]<oo, then P{lim1_ 00 X,=l}>O. 
· The following statement gives conditions which ensure convergence of {X,} 
with positive probability to nondegenerate intervals in every point of which 
f (x) = x. It can be proved by an argument similar to the one presented in 
Arthur et al. ( 1988). 
Theorem 5. Let (a, b) ~ B, a< b, and f (x) = x \Ix E (a, b) n R(O, 1). Also sup-
pose, that there exist e1 >0 and e2 >0 such that f(x)>O for xE(a-e1>a)n 
R(0,1) and f(x)<l for xE(b,b+e)nR(0,1). Then P{lim,_ 00 p(X1,(a,b))= 
0}>0 for every X 1 E(a-e1,b+t:2 ). Moreover, if X, a.s. converges to X 0 , then 
P{X0 E(a,b)}>0 for every X 1 E(a-e1,b+e2 ). 
In conclusion, we shall note that for f ( · ), which depends on time, i.e., 
at time instant t, balls are added with probabilities f,(X,) and 1- f,(X,), in 
such a way that L:,~ 1 t - 1 a,<ro, Theorems 1-5 still hold. Here a,= 
SUPxe[O. 11 n R(O, I) I f,(x) - f (x)I. 
Now we are ready to formulate the main conceptual results of the paper. 
3. Sharing a market of risk averse adopters with two new competing 
technologies 
On the grounds of the foregoing apparatus let us examine the dynamics of 
two competing technologies. Consider an adoption of a unit of the A 
technology as an addition of a white ball into an urn and an adoption of a 
unit of the B technology as an addition of a black ball. The problem can be 
easily put into the framework of urn schemes. Let us generalize the model 
introduced by Arthur et al. ( 1983). 
Suppose that the two technologies, A and B, are identical in terms of some 
utility measure for the adopters. However, the latter are only imperfectly 
informed about them so that they make their choices by asking an odd 
number m ~I of adopters who are already using the technologies. An 
alternative hypothesis to the same effect is that there are positive (or 
negative) externalities in adoption which change the returns to the user along 
the diffusion process, but adopters, in order to estimate them, can only 
sample a fixed number of users. In both cases, we assume that any new 
adopter will choose with probability a the technology used by the majority 
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of the sample m and with probability 1 - a the technology of the minority of 
them. 2 [For a= 0 or a= 1 the model coincides with ones considered in 
Arthur et al. (1983)]. 
The probability of choosing A as a function of xA, has the following form: 
PA(xA) =axA +(1-a)(l-xA)=(l-a)+(2a- l)xA for m= 1 
and 
PA(xA) = ap(m, xA) + ( 1 -a)[l - p(m, xA)] + o( 1) = 1 -a 
+(2a-l)p(m,xA)+o(l) for m>l, 
where p(m, x) = Ir=<m+ 1112 C~xi(l-xr-i (C~ is the number of combinations 
form m to i). Moreover, o(l) goes to zero (as const. n- 1 ) uniformly on 
x E [O, 1] for n-+ oo (here n designates the number of e.g. consumers who 
have adopted one of the technologies). The function f(x) = 1-
a +(2a- l)p(m, x) for mf;l is given graphically in fig. 1. Continuous lines 
correspond here to the case whereby a>Hl+(l/p'(m,i))]; broken lines to 
the case whereby a<t[l +(l/p'(m,i))]; and the horizontal line to a= 1/2. 
Using the results from section 2 the following conclusions can be drawn. 
Form= 1 and for every a< 1 the function f(x)-x has the only root x= 
1/2. Consequently, Theorem 1 shows that X, (the proportion of the A 
technology on the market at time t) converges with probability 1 to 1/2 as 
t-+oo. That is, the market is shared in the limit by A and B in the 
proportion 1:1. For m>l and a~t[l+(l/p'(m,t))] exactly the same argu-
ment shows that in the limit the market is shared by A and B in the 
proportion 1:1. For m>l and a>i[l+(l /p'(m,t))] the function f(x)-x has 
three zeros: x 0 (a), 1/2 and x 1(a)=l-x0(a). Theorem 1 gives convergence of 
X, with probability 1 to the set B={x0 (a), 1/2, x 1(a)} as t-+oo. As far as 
both x0 ( a) and x 1 (a) turn out to be stable, Theorem 2 assures that X 1 
converges with positive probability to either x 0 (a) or x 1 (a) (from every initial 
approximation). Finally the observations that 1/2 is an unstable point 
together with Theorem 3 (in the case when condition (I) occurs) show that 
X, converges to 1/2 with zero probability (from every initial approximation). 
Consequently, form> 1 and a:>Hl +(1 /p'(m,t))], in the limit, the market can 
be shared by A and B in proportions (each with positive probability) 
x0 (a):[l-x0 (a)] and [l -x0 (a)]:x0 (a) . 
The foregoing argument shows how the results of section 2 can be used to 
describe limit states for a given urn function. Let us just mention some 
further properties which follow from the theorems of section 2. 
2Note that the model is agnostic with respect to specific theories of learning and choice, but 
consistent with a few of them. For example, one could assume that a~Hl+(l/p'(m , ~J)] and 
increases with the sample size. (That is, agents weight their observations by some statistical 
criterion of reliability.) At the opposite extreme, the model may easily accommodate behaviors 
such as the search for diversity in consumption ('I don't like what the majority likes . . .' ). Finally, 
the model can account for the persistence of non-average behaviors (on financial markets, cf. 
Kirman (1991)]. 
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Fig. I 
The main new elements of this model compared with those obtained m 
Arthur et al. ( 1983) are the following: 
(a) if m = 1, then for every a< 1 there is only one feasible limit market 
sharing, in contrast with the case a= 1, where, firstly, feasible limit 
market shares coincide with the whole closed interval [O, I] and, 
secondly, these limit market shares belong to each of subintervals 
(a, b) E [O, 1] with positive probability; 
(b) if m > 1, then for every a< 1, unlike the case a= 1, there is no monopoly 
market shares [because x0(a)>0 and consequently x 1(a)<l] in spite of 
the fact that x 0 (a)--+ 0 and, thus, x 1 (a)-+ I as a--+ 1. 
From an economic point of view, the result shows, it is an 'imperfect' 
process of information-acquisition (or endogenous preference formation) 
which curbs the tendency toward technological monopoly and allows an 
equilibrium co-existence of variety. (Note also that this variety may simply 
be based on equilibrium distributions of diverse expectations on otherwise 
identical technologies, in terms of utility derived from them.) 3 
3Clearly, the applicability of the model is by no means restricted to technical change: for 
example, it could be used to interpret estimates of the 'fundamentals ' in macroeconomic models 
and the ensuing coexistence of diverse 'models of the world'. 
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Fig. 2 
4. A model of competition under implicit preferences of consumers in the case 
of approximately equal prices 
Let us now introduce a price dynamics for the two technologies. Suppose, 
that two firms compete for a market of infinite capacity. Let us now 
designate both the firms and their products (technologies) with A and B. As 
a first approximation to a pricing strategy, consider the following: each firm 
reduces the price until it reaches a certain level of market share, defined by 
the proportion of the product of this firm among all products which have 
been sold up to the current time (usually greater than 1/2). Above that level 
it increases it. Let us consider the simplest (linear) case of this policy. This is 
graphically represented in fig. 2. Here Pr A(xA) designates the dependence of 
the price of the technology A as a function of its proportion xA among all 
adopters who are using either technology. Symmetrically, Pr8(xA) designates 
the dependence of the price of the technology B as a function of xA. [Of 
course, the proportions of technologies A and B are complements: xA + x8 = 
I.] By xt and x~ we designate the critical levels of market shares which 
switch from falling- to rising-price rules. Hence, the dependence of the price 
of the A (B) technology on its proportion on the market xA (x8 ) is given by 
four parameters: Pr A(O), xt, Pr A(xt), Pr A( 1) [Pr8(1}, x~, Pr8(l -x:), Pr8 (0)]. 
Note that the model accounts also for the circumstances where PrA(l)~ 
PrA(xt) [Pr8(0}~Pr8(l -xm , such as when xt= l(x~= I): in this case, firm A 
(B) reduces indefinitely the price on its product as its market share increases. 
It is natural to suppose that in the case where the 'quality' of the 
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technologies is approximately the same and potential consumers know about 
it, the technology which is cheaper has more chances of being sold, i.e., the A 
technology is bought if Pr A(xJ- Pr8(xJ < 0. But, if the prices differ slightly 
or consumers have some specific preferences (which can be characterized 
only statistically or on average), this sometimes leads to the adoption of the 
more expensive technology. Such a situation can be mathematically forma-
lized in the following way [see also Hanson (1985)]. The A technology is 
bought if Pr A(xA)- Pr8(xA) + ~ < 0, where ~ is a random variable. Then the 
probability f (xA) to choose the A technology, as a function of xA> equal 
Pg< Pr8 (xA)- PrA(xA) }. To avoid unnecessary sophistications of the model, 
we shall suppose that ~ possesses density with respect to the Lebesgue 
measure in R 1 [otherwise the event 'Pr8(xA)- Pr A(xA) + ~ = O' can have 
positive probability]. Also, it is natural to suppose that ~ has a bounded 
support. This means that Pg E [-ix, ix]}= l for some ix> 0. That is, adopters 
have a 'threshold' decision rule: above a certain price differential they choose 
deterministically; below, they follow randomized strategies. To simplify our 
considerations, suppose that ~ has a uniform distribution on [-ix, ix]. Since 
random factors appear when prices on A and B are approximately equal, 
then the inequality ix<mini=t ,2 , 3 , 4 L1i holds. The probability of choosing A 
as a function of xA in this case has the form 
for Pr8(xA)- Pr A(xA) ~IX, 
f(xA)= ~ 0 for Pr8(xA) - PrA(xA)~ -IX, (3) 
[Pr8(xA)- Pr A(xA) + ix]/ 2ix for -ix< Pr8(xA)- Pr A(xA) <ix. 
This is graphically represented in fig. 3. Hence, the model embodies a 
positive feedback mechanism of diffusion: prices fall with increasing market 
shares possibly due to learning economies, dynamic increasing returns, etc., 
and/or, on the behavioral side, to market-penetration strategies. However, 
the mechanism is bounded: above a certain market share, the price starts to 
rise, possibly due to monopolistic behaviors of the producer(s) and/or to the 
progressive exhaustion of technological opportunities to lower production 
costs. Finally, market adjustments as a function of differential prices are 
'imperfect': within boundaries, differently priced technologies both face 
positive demand. What can one say on the limit shares of such a bounded-
increasing-returns process of diffusion? Using the results of section 2 we have 
the following: 
(1) convergence to xj with probability l takes place from the domain I (cf. 
fig. 3); 
(2) from the domain II there is convergence with positive probability to 
both xj and x!; 
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(3) convergence to x! with probability 1 takes place from the domain III. 
In terms of competing technologies, these results can be conceptually 
treated in the following way. If the initial proportion of adopters of 
technology A belongs to the domain I {III), then the technologies A and B 
share the market in the proportion x!: ( 1 - x!)(x!: (1- xj)). Moreover, if the 
initial proportion of adopters of technology A belongs to the domain II, then 
A and B share the market in the proportion xf: (l -xi) or x!: (1-x!) (with 
positive probability in each of the cases). 
More generally: diffusion with endogenous prices and bounded dynamic 
increasing returns yields market-sharing rather than monopoly. Still, limit 
market shares are path-dependent: they are determined by the history of the 
diffusion process. The model, however, allows a qualitative analysis - by no 
means restricted to the price dynamics assumed here - of the ensuing limit 
proportions dependent on the relative frequencies of initial adopters of the 
different technologies. 
Let us now turn to the effects on diffusion dynamics of different degrees of 
'market stickiness', as approximated by a.. 
If a.= A; for some i, then the corresponding horizontal part of the graph of 
f( ·) converts into a 'sharp', where f ( · ) attains 0 or 1. If the distribution of~ 
is not uniform, then sloping (straight) line segments of the graph of f ( ·) 
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convert into curve linear ones. And, finally, if a> max; = 1 . 2 . 3 , 4 LI; (in particu-
lar, when e has an unbounded support, as in the normal distribution), then 
all of horizontal segments transform into 'sharps' of corresponding height 
[from (0, 1)]. In this case we can obtain the graph presented in fig. 4. Here 
[as follows from the results of Arthur et al. (1987a, 1988), Hill et al. (1980)], 
convergence with positive probability (from every initial approximation) 
takes place to both xj and x!. Consequently, regardless of the initial 
proportions of adopters of the two technologies, A and B share the market 
in the proportions xf: ( 1 - xi) or x!: ( 1 - x!). Which one depends on chance. 
Implicit preferences of adopters (or, which is basically the same, prefer-
ences with imperfect information and 'market-stickiness') can be formalized 
in a slighly different way. Suppose that if the difference of the prices is not 
less than a> 0, then the cheaper technology is bought. If the difference is less 
than the value, then consumers to choose a technology use some stochastic 
experiment (i.e., a mixed strategy). Here a<min; =i .2 . 3 , 4 .d; . Consider the 
following examples: 
Case I. A is chosen with probability p E (0, l) and B with probability 1 - p 
(usually, when there is no a priori preference, p= 1/2). 
Case 2. Would-be adopters sample an odd number m> 1 of adopters who 
have already selected one of the technologies and choose the technology 
which is used by the majority (minority) of them. 
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The corresponding probabilities f (xA) to choose A as a function of xA, are 
represented graphically in figs. 5 and 6 (in the latter case we neglect the term 
which goes to zero; see section 3). Note that in fig. 6 in order to designate 
those parts of the graph where f( · ) does not attain either 0 or 1, we use 
continuous (broken) lines according to whether the choice follows the 
majority (minority) of the sample. 
Using the results from section 2, in case 1, we obtain: (i) from the domain 
I convergence to xi with probability l; (ii) convergence with positive 
probability to xi, p and x! from the domain II; (iii) convergence to x! with 
probability 1 from the domain III. Hence, the limit market-shares properties 
are similar to those considered earlier in this section. 
However, consider now the case of endogenous prices, as above, jointly 
with endogenous preferences for either technology, whereby choices corres-
ponds to the option of the sampled majority. We obtain the following limit 
shares: (1) from the domain I convergence to xi with probability l; (2) 
convergence with positive probability to both xi and x! from the domain II; 
(3) from the dGmain III convergence with probability 1 to x!. 
In all of the considered cases, monopoly (i.e., the situation where one of 
the technologies conquers the market) is impossible. To reach monopoly one 
must change the relation between prices on A and B. As it might be intuitive 
if systematically Pr A(O) > Pr8 (0), then we can have monopoly of the B 
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technology. Conversely, if PrA(l)<Pr8 (1), one can arrive at monopoly of 
technology A. 
More generally, though, the model highlights the crucial importance of 
specific price dynamics in the determination of limit market shares. Some 
(more 'evolutionary' inclined) economists might interpret the result as an 
analytical corroboration of the conjecture that out-of-equilibrium 'boundedly 
rational' behavioral norms do affect system-level asymptotic states.4 Alter-
natively one may argue that all this simply emphasizes the dependence of 
limit market shares upon expectations and intertemporal discount procedures 
of supposedly perfect rational but imperfectly informed producers of each 
technology. 5 Irrespective of the precise microeconomic assumption, again, 
the model allows qualitative analyses of the relationships between endoge-
nous price changes, adoption frequencies and limit market shares. 
By way of illustration, suppose for example that the switching point 
between price-decreasing and price-increasing strategies occurs at less than 
1/2 market shares. In this case, we obtain the picture shown in fig. 7. 
Moreover, if price-dependent choices involve a random error uniformly 
4 ln such an evolutionary perspective, pricing 'strategies' may be understood as routines setting 
desired profit margins as a function of asymmetries in production efficiency or in the ability to 
exploit market power: cf. Nelson and Winter ( 1982) and Dosi ( 1984). 
5 Yet another hypothesis is that the price dynamics assumed above is some crude approxi-
mation to a Bertrand game under (bounded) increasing returns. 
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distributed on [-!X,cx] (with cx<min;=i. 2 , 3 , 4 L1J, then the probability of 
choosing A as a function of xA is illustrated in fig. 8. Using the results from 
section 2, we have: (1) if the initial proportion of adopters of the technology 
A belongs to the domain I (V), then B (A) conquers the market; (2) if the 
proportion belongs to the domain III, then A and B share the market in the 
proportion x!: (1-x!); (3) if the initial proportion of adopters of the 
technology A belongs to the domain II (IV), then the technology B (A) 
conquers market shares in the proportion x!: (1-x!). 
Consequently, under the given hypotheses concerning the behavior of 
adopters, massive introduction of one of the technologies (domains I and V), 
which is significantly cheaper in these domains, leads to monopoly. Under 
less massive introduction (domains II and IV) we can either have monopoly 
or alternatively, A and B share the market in the proportion x! : ( 1 - x!). In 
the case of comparable initial numbers of adopters of A and B (domain Ill) 
these technologies share the market in the proportion x!: ( l - x!). 
Note also that the formal apparatus developed here can be used to study 
all cases whereby prices depend on the current concentration of one of the 
technologies on the market in an arbitrary way (while here for the sake of 
simplicity we restricted the discussion to cases where these functions are 
piecewise linear) . 
5. Conclusions 
Innovation and technology diffusion generally involve competition among 
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different technologies, and, most often, endogenous changes in the costs/ 
prices of technologies themselves and in adopters' choices. In the economic 
domain (as well as in other disciplines) the formal representation of such 
processes involves some dynamics of competing 'populations' (i.e., technolo-
gives, firms, or even behavioral traits and 'models' of expectation formation). 
A growing literature on such dynamics has begun studying the properties of 
those (generally non-linear) processes that innovation and diffusion entail. As 
is now robustly established, multiple equilibria are normally to be expected. 
'History matters', also in the sense that out-of-equilibrium fluctuations may 
bear system-level consequences on notional asymptotic outcomes. Develop-
ing on previous results showing - under dynamic increasing returns - the 
likely 'lock-in' of diffusion trajectories onto particular technologies, we have 
presented a formal modeling apparatus aimed at handling the interaction 
between diffusion patterns, on the one hand, and endogenous preferences 
formation and/ or endogenous price formation, on the other. As examples, we 
presented two stochastic models of shares dynamics on a market of infinite 
capacity by two competing new technologies. In the first of them, we 
assumed that the adoption dynamics is essentially driven by endogenous 
changes in the choices of risk-averse, imperfectly informed adopters (or, in a 
formally equivalent analogy, by some positive or negative externality imper-
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fectly estimated by would-be users of alternative technologies). In the second 
example, we considered an endogenous price dynamics of two alternative 
technologies, driven by e.g., changes in their costs of production and/or by 
the intertemporal behaviors of their producers. 
In both cases, the diffusion process is allowed to embody some stochasti-
city, due to e.g., 'imperfect' learning from other people's choices, marginal 
and formally undetectable differences in users' preferences, or some inertia in 
adjusting between differently priced but identical-return technologies. 
The formal apparatus presented here, based on a few refinements on 
generalized urn schemes, allows quite general analytical accounts of the 
relationships between some system-parameters (e.g., proxies for information 
'imperfection' by adopters; dynamic increasing returns and monopolistic 
exploitation of new technologies by their producers) and limit market shares. 
While path-dependency (i.e. 'history matters') applies throughout, the forego-
ing analytical techniques appear to be able, at the very least, to discriminate 
those which turn out to be feasible limit equilibria (i.e., those which are 
attainable with positive probabilities) and, also, to 'map' them into the 
relative frequencies of initial adopters. 
As the foregoing modeling illustrations show, 'market imperfections' and 
'informational imperfections' often tend to foster technological variety, i.e., 
the equilibrium co-existence of different technologies and firms. Moreover, 
stochasticity in the choice process may well bifurcate limit market-shares 
outcomes. Finally, we have shown that corporate pricing strategies - possibly 
based on boundedly rational procedures, imperfect infomation or even 
systematically 'wrong' expectation-formation mechanisms - generally 
influence long-term outcomes. Under all these circumstances, the foregoing 
modeling techniques allow, at the very least, a 'qualitative' analytical 
assessment of diffusion/competition processes by no means restricted to those 
cases where microeconomic expectations, on average, represent unbiased 
estimations of the future. 
Whenever this analytical representation is empirically adequate, there seem 
to be no a priori reasons to restrict it to technological dynamics. In fact , 
under suitable modifications, it may apply as well to interdependent expec-
tations, decision and returns on e.g., industrial or financial markets. Ulti-
mately, what we have tried to implement is a relatively general analytical 
apparatus able to handle at least some qualitative properties of dynamic 
stochastic processes characterized by both positive, and, possibly, negative, 
feedbacks of a functional form as 'badly-behaved' as possible. Indeed, we 
believe, quite a few of the processes of economic change fall into this 
category, related to technological change but also to interdependent (possibly 
'disequilibrium' ) changes in e.g., industrial structures, financial markets or 
macroeconomics dynamics. 
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